Filters
Question type

Scenario 17-2. Imagine that two oil companies, BQ and Exxoff, own adjacent oil fields. Under the fields is a common pool of oil worth $144 million. Drilling a well to recover oil costs $5 million per well. If each company drills one well, each will get half of the oil and earn a $67 million profit ($72 million in revenue - $5 million in costs) . Assume that having X percent of the total wells means that a company will collect X percent of the total revenue. -Refer to Scenario 17-2. If BQ were to drill a second well, what would its profit be if Exxoff did not drill a second well?


A) $43 million
B) $67 million
C) $86 million
D) $129 million

E) A) and B)
F) B) and C)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Table 17-13 Two home-improvement stores (Lopes and HomeMax) in a growing urban area are interested in expanding their market share. Both are interested in expanding the size of their store and parking lot to accommodate potential growth in their customer base. The following game depicts the strategic outcomes that result from the game. Increases in annual profits of the two home-improvement stores are shown in the table below. Table 17-13 Two home-improvement stores (Lopes and HomeMax)  in a growing urban area are interested in expanding their market share. Both are interested in expanding the size of their store and parking lot to accommodate potential growth in their customer base. The following game depicts the strategic outcomes that result from the game. Increases in annual profits of the two home-improvement stores are shown in the table below.    14. -Refer to Table 17-13. If both stores follow a dominant strategy, HomeMax's annual profit will grow by A)  $0.6 million. B)  $1.5 million. C)  $2.5 million. D)  $3.4 million. 14. -Refer to Table 17-13. If both stores follow a dominant strategy, HomeMax's annual profit will grow by


A) $0.6 million.
B) $1.5 million.
C) $2.5 million.
D) $3.4 million.

E) A) and D)
F) A) and B)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Figure 17-5. Two companies, ABC and QRS, are sellers in the same market. Each company decides whether to charge a high price or a low price. In the figure, the dollar amounts are payoffs and they represent annual profits for the two companies. Figure 17-5. Two companies, ABC and QRS, are sellers in the same market. Each company decides whether to charge a high price or a low price. In the figure, the dollar amounts are payoffs and they represent annual profits for the two companies.   -Refer to Figure 17-5. The situation faced by ABC and QRS is A)  one in which the players, pursuing their own interests, are likely to reach an outcome that is not particularly good for either player. B)  one in which an agreement between the players to behave in a certain way is not likely to hold up. C)  similar to the situation faced by Bonnie and Clyde in the prisoners' dilemma game. D)  All of the above are correct. -Refer to Figure 17-5. The situation faced by ABC and QRS is


A) one in which the players, pursuing their own interests, are likely to reach an outcome that is not particularly good for either player.
B) one in which an agreement between the players to behave in a certain way is not likely to hold up.
C) similar to the situation faced by Bonnie and Clyde in the prisoners' dilemma game.
D) All of the above are correct.

E) C) and D)
F) B) and D)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Table 17-16 This table shows a game played between two players, A and B. The payoffs are given in the table as (Payoff to A, Payoff to B) . Table 17-16 This table shows a game played between two players, A and B. The payoffs are given in the table as (Payoff to A, Payoff to B) .    -Refer to Table 17-16. Which of the following outcomes represents a Nash equilibrium in the game? A)  Middle-Center B)  Down-Center C)  Up-Left D)  More than one of the above is a Nash equilibrium in this game. -Refer to Table 17-16. Which of the following outcomes represents a Nash equilibrium in the game?


A) Middle-Center
B) Down-Center
C) Up-Left
D) More than one of the above is a Nash equilibrium in this game.

E) A) and B)
F) None of the above

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Which of the following statements is false?


A) The Clayton Act allows triple damages in civil lawsuits in order to encourage lawsuits against conspiring oligopolists.
B) Many economists defend the practice of resale price maintenance on the grounds that it may help solve a free-rider problem.
C) Most economists agree that predatory pricing is a profitable business strategy that usually preserves market power.
D) The U.S. Supreme Court's view that the practice of tying usually allows a firm to extend its market power is not generally supported by economic theory.

E) A) and D)
F) A) and C)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

In the prisoners' dilemma,


A) the prisoners easily collude in order to achieve the best possible payoff for both.
B) only one player has a dominant strategy.
C) when each player chooses his dominant strategy the players achieve the best joint outcome.
D) when each player chooses his dominant strategy the players reach a Nash equilibrium.

E) A) and B)
F) A) and C)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Ford and General Motors are considering expanding into the Vietnamese automobile market. Devise a simple prisoners' dilemma game to demonstrate the strategic considerations that are relevant to this decision.

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

The answer should present two strategies...

View Answer

Table 17-31 Imagine a small town in a remote area where only two residents, Maria and Miguel, own dairies that produce milk that is safe to drink. Each week Maria and Miguel work together to decide how many gallons of milk to produce. They bring milk to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Maria and Miguel can produce as much milk as they want without cost so that the marginal cost is zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for milk is shown in the table below: Table 17-31 Imagine a small town in a remote area where only two residents, Maria and Miguel, own dairies that produce milk that is safe to drink. Each week Maria and Miguel work together to decide how many gallons of milk to produce. They bring milk to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Maria and Miguel can produce as much milk as they want without cost so that the marginal cost is zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for milk is shown in the table below:    -Refer to Table 17-31. Briefly explain why each duopolist earns a lower profit at the Nash equilibrium than if they cooperated to produce the monopoly output. -Refer to Table 17-31. Briefly explain why each duopolist earns a lower profit at the Nash equilibrium than if they cooperated to produce the monopoly output.

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

The monopoly outcome occurs at the highe...

View Answer

As the number of firms in an oligopoly industry increases, the market moves closer to a market.

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Scenario 17-3. Consider two countries, Kinglandia and Rovinastan, that are engaged in an arms race. Each country must decide whether to build new weapons or to disarm existing weapons. Each country prefers to have more arms than the other because a large arsenal gives it more influence in world affairs. But each country also prefers to live in a world safe from the other country's weapons. The following table shows the possible outcomes for each decision combination. The numbers in each cell represent the country's ranking of the outcome (10 = best outcome, 1 = worst outcome) . Scenario 17-3. Consider two countries, Kinglandia and Rovinastan, that are engaged in an arms race. Each country must decide whether to build new weapons or to disarm existing weapons. Each country prefers to have more arms than the other because a large arsenal gives it more influence in world affairs. But each country also prefers to live in a world safe from the other country's weapons. The following table shows the possible outcomes for each decision combination. The numbers in each cell represent the country's ranking of the outcome (10 = best outcome, 1 = worst outcome) .    -Refer to Scenario 17-3. If each country only makes a choice of whether to build or disarm one time and Rovinastan chooses to build new weapons, then Kinglandia will A)  disarm to signal its willingness to cooperate. B)  disarm to promote world peace. C)  build new weapons to prevent the loss of influence in world affairs. D)  None of the above are correct. -Refer to Scenario 17-3. If each country only makes a choice of whether to build or disarm one time and Rovinastan chooses to build new weapons, then Kinglandia will


A) disarm to signal its willingness to cooperate.
B) disarm to promote world peace.
C) build new weapons to prevent the loss of influence in world affairs.
D) None of the above are correct.

E) C) and D)
F) B) and C)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Table 17-12 The table shows the town of Driveaway's demand schedule for gasoline. Assume the town's gasoline seller(s) incurs a cost of $2 for each gallon sold, with no fixed cost. Table 17-12 The table shows the town of Driveaway's demand schedule for gasoline. Assume the town's gasoline seller(s)  incurs a cost of $2 for each gallon sold, with no fixed cost.    -Refer to Table 17-12. If there are exactly five sellers of gasoline in Driveaway and if they collude, then which of the following outcomes is most likely? A)  Each seller will sell 50 gallons and charge a price of $3. B)  Each seller will sell 40 gallons and charge a price of $4. C)  Each seller will sell 30 gallons and charge a price of $4. D)  Each seller will sell 30 gallons and charge a price of $5. -Refer to Table 17-12. If there are exactly five sellers of gasoline in Driveaway and if they collude, then which of the following outcomes is most likely?


A) Each seller will sell 50 gallons and charge a price of $3.
B) Each seller will sell 40 gallons and charge a price of $4.
C) Each seller will sell 30 gallons and charge a price of $4.
D) Each seller will sell 30 gallons and charge a price of $5.

E) A) and B)
F) A) and C)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

In which of the following games is it clearly the case that the cooperative outcome of the game is good for the two players and good for society?


A) Two guilty criminals have been captured by the police, and each prisoner decides whether to confess or to remain silent.
B) Two airlines dominate air travel between City A and City B, and each airline decides whether to charge a "high" airfare or a "low" airfare.
C) Two duopoly firms account for all of the production in a market, and each firm decides whether to produce a "high" amount of output or a "low" amount of output.
D) Two oil companies own adjacent oil fields over a common pool of oil, and each company decides whether to drill one well or two wells.

E) A) and B)
F) A) and C)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Suppose two companies own adjacent oil fields. Under the two fields is a common pool of oil worth $60 million. For each well that is drilled, the company that drills the well incurs a cost of $4 million. Each company can drill up to two wells. What is the likely outcome of this game if each company pursues its own self-interest?


A) Each company drills one well and experiences a profit of $26 million.
B) Each company drills one well and experiences a profit of $22 million.
C) Each company drills two wells and experiences a profit of $22 million.
D) One company drills two wells and experiences a profit of $32 million; the other company drills one well and experiences a profit of $16 million.

E) C) and D)
F) None of the above

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Table 17-6 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Kunal and Naj, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Kunal and Naj work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump, to bring the water to town, and to sell it at whatever price the market will bear. Assume Kunal and Naj can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water are shown in the table below. Table 17-6 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Kunal and Naj, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Kunal and Naj work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump, to bring the water to town, and to sell it at whatever price the market will bear. Assume Kunal and Naj can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water are shown in the table below.    -Refer to Table 17-6. Suppose the town enacts new antitrust laws that prohibit Kunal and Naj from operating as a monopolist. Once the Nash equilibrium is reached, how much profit will each producer earn? A)  $400.00 B)  $437.50 C)  $450.00 D)  $800.00 -Refer to Table 17-6. Suppose the town enacts new antitrust laws that prohibit Kunal and Naj from operating as a monopolist. Once the Nash equilibrium is reached, how much profit will each producer earn?


A) $400.00
B) $437.50
C) $450.00
D) $800.00

E) None of the above
F) A) and B)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Although the practice of predatory pricing is a common claim in antitrust suits, some economists are skeptical of this argument because they believe


A) the evidence of its practice is nearly impossible to collect.
B) predatory pricing is not a profitable business strategy.
C) even though predatory pricing is a profitable business strategy, it is on balance beneficial to society.
D) predatory pricing actually attracts new firms to the industry.

E) B) and C)
F) None of the above

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Table 17-13 Two home-improvement stores (Lopes and HomeMax) in a growing urban area are interested in expanding their market share. Both are interested in expanding the size of their store and parking lot to accommodate potential growth in their customer base. The following game depicts the strategic outcomes that result from the game. Increases in annual profits of the two home-improvement stores are shown in the table below. Table 17-13 Two home-improvement stores (Lopes and HomeMax)  in a growing urban area are interested in expanding their market share. Both are interested in expanding the size of their store and parking lot to accommodate potential growth in their customer base. The following game depicts the strategic outcomes that result from the game. Increases in annual profits of the two home-improvement stores are shown in the table below.    14. -Refer to Table 17-13. Pursuing its own best interest, HomeMax will A)  increase the size of its store and parking lot only if Lopes also increases the size of its store and parking lot. B)  increase the size of its store and parking lot only if Lopes does not increase the size of its store and parking lot. C)  increase the size of its store and parking lot regardless of the decision made by Lopes. D)  not increase the size of its store and parking lot regardless of the decision made by Lopes. 14. -Refer to Table 17-13. Pursuing its own best interest, HomeMax will


A) increase the size of its store and parking lot only if Lopes also increases the size of its store and parking lot.
B) increase the size of its store and parking lot only if Lopes does not increase the size of its store and parking lot.
C) increase the size of its store and parking lot regardless of the decision made by Lopes.
D) not increase the size of its store and parking lot regardless of the decision made by Lopes.

E) A) and B)
F) A) and C)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Showing 481 - 496 of 496

Related Exams

Show Answer